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Abstract
Competing firms are usually better informed about their own cost parameters than about
those of their rivals. Therefore, it is an important issue to study the incentives of firms to
exchange private cost information. We resolve and further generalize an influential model of
Raith (1996) and show that, independent of the number of firms, concealing cost information
is a dominant firm strategy in heterogeneous Bertrand oligopolies with substitutive as well as
with complementary goods.
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1 Introduction
Competing ﬁrms are usually better informed about their own cost and demand pa-
rameters than about those of their rivals. Therefore, it is an important issue in the
Industrial Organization theory to study the incentives of ﬁrms to exchange private
information (see, e.g., Vives 1999, ch. 8). The literature on information sharing in
oligopoly is vast. However, most papers study Cournot competition in homogeneous
markets. Only few authors deal with price competition in heterogeneous markets,
even if this kind of competition is most important in the industrial sectors of an
economy. Vives (1984) and Sakai (1986) have concentrated on the exchange of de-
mand information, while Gal-Or (1986) and Sakai (1991) have studied the expected
gains of exchanging cost information. These Bertrand duopoly models yield the well
known result that ﬁrms reveal their private information in Bayesian equilibrium un-
der demand uncertainty, while under cost uncertainty they do not. In an inﬂuential
paper, Raith (1996) has developed a uniﬁed approach in which he derives the results
of these models as special cases.
While it is generally accepted in the literature that the duopoly results with demand
uncertainty generalize to oligopolistic market structures, Raith (1996, p. 279) has
argued that with cost uncertainty “... results obtained for duopolies do not extend
to larger markets”. Instead, for a large number of rivals in the market, unilateral
revelation of private cost information should be a dominant strategy. This far-
reaching conclusion indicates that the concealing strategy of ﬁrms is not very robust.
As has been pointed out by Jin (2000), however, this surprising implication is solely
based on an algebraic error in the original model.
The present paper therefore presents a general solution of Raith’s (1996) model
for the theoretically and empirically most interesting case of cost uncertainty and
derives the robust result that concealing cost information is an unambiguously domi-
nant strategy in price competition with substitutive as well as with complementary
goods.2
2 The Model
We consider a market consisting of n ≥ 2 ﬁrms, each producing a diﬀerentiated
good. According to most models in the information sharing literature, we assume a
quasi-linear quadratic utility function











of a representative consumer. Each consumer demands q0 units of the numéraire
good and qi units of the diﬀerentiated goods i = 1,...,n, represented by the vector
q = (q1,...,qn)
0. We impose the usual parameter restrictions αi > 0, βij = β >





∀ i 6= j. Consumers maximize utility subject




piqi ≤ I, (2)
where I denotes income and p = (p1,...,pi,...,pn)
0 is the price vector of goods
i = 1,...,n. If income is large enough, the ﬁrst-order conditions determining the
optimal consumption levels of all goods lead to the linear demand functions
Di (p) = ai − bpi + d
X
j6=i





(β−γ)[β+(n−1)γ] , b :=
β+(n−2)γ








. In this general model, corresponding to the demand pa-
rameters γ and d, the goods are substitutes (γ,d > 0), complements (γ,d < 0) or
independent (γ = d = 0).
We assume the same type of information structure as in Gal-Or (1986), i.e., ﬁrms
know the distribution function of their constant unit cost, but are only imperfectly
informed about the realizations. The deviations τi from the expected values ci are3
independently and identically normally distributed with means zero and variances
t ≥ 0, i.e. τi ∼ N (0,t).1
If ﬁrms knew the realization of their respective deviation parameters τi, but were
uncertain about the rivals’ cost parameters, the underlying information structure
would be a standard one of asymmetric information. However, the assessment of
the advantage or disadvantage of information exchange becomes more complicated
if ﬁrms have to decide about their information revelation behavior at a point in
time when information about their own unit cost is also uncertain. As in the Gal-Or
(1986) model, we simultaneously analyze both stochastic uncertainty of ﬁrms about
their own unit cost as well as asymmetric information between the competitors.
Firm i’s ex ante observed signal for the deviation parameter τi is ϕi = τi + ψi,
where the signal errors ψi are also assumed to be independently and identically
normally distributed with means zero and variances u ≥ 0, i.e. ψi ∼ N (0,u). Thus,
ﬁrms can make no inferences about the unit cost of their rivals based on their pri-
vate cost information. However, each ﬁrm has the option to signal its perception
of unit cost to the rivals. In a very general way we may account for the precision
of a strategic information revelation by specifying the signal as ˆ ϕi = ϕi + ξi. The
strategic revelation deviations ξi are also assumed to be independently and identi-
cally normally distributed random variables with means zero and variances ri ≥ 0,
i.e. ξi ∼ N (0,ri). If the signal is sent with zero variance (ri = 0), ﬁrm i perfectly
reveals its cost information. In the case of an inﬁnitely high variance (ri → ∞),
it conceals its private information.2 All ﬁrms have to make their pricing decisions
using all available cost information, represented by their respective information sets
zi = (ϕi, ˆ ϕ)
0 with the vector ˆ ϕ
0 = (ˆ ϕ1,..., ˆ ϕn) of revealed information by all ﬁrms.
1 There may be parameter constellations where the nonnegativity constraint of unit cost is not ful-
ﬁlled if the random variables are assumed to be normally distributed. However, this distribution
function which is usually applied in the information exchange literature can be interpreted as
an approximation of any speciﬁc distribution function or as the result of the additive clustering
of several independently distributed singular random variables.
2 Under these circumstances, strategic lying in the revelation process as modeled by Ziv (1993) is
excluded. Firms only have the option to reveal their cost information with an arbitrarily large
noise. This means that concealing occurs by announcing and sending worthless signals.4











[pi − (ci + τi)]
 











where E is the expected value operator. The necessary ﬁrst-order conditions3 lead













Since the resulting equilibrium strategies are aﬃne in the information sets zi, the
proposed solution equations take the form
pi (zi) = η0i + η1iϕi + η2i
0 ˆ ϕ . (6)
In order to solve for prices in Bayesian equilibrium, we have to determine the coeﬃ-
cients η0i,η1i ∈ R and η2i ∈ Rn. For the expected price decisions of the competitors
we obtain
E
i [pj (zj)|zi] = η0j + η1jE
i (ϕj|zi) + η2j
0 ˆ ϕ , i,j = 1,...,n, i 6= j . (7)
Due to the assumptions of the normal distributions, the conditional means E
i (ϕj|zi)
solve as E
i (ϕj|zi) = t+u
t+u+rjej
0 ˆ ϕ, where ej is the j-th unit vector. In an analogous




By inserting these conditional means together with equation (7) into the reaction
functions (5) and equating the resulting expressions with the proposed solution
equations (6), the coeﬃcients can be identiﬁed as
η0i =
[2b − (n − 2)d](ai + bci) + d
P
j6=i (aj + bcj)






3 The suﬃcient conditions for a proﬁt maximum are globally met. In order to simplify the analysis,





(2b + d)[2b − (n − 1)d]
v −
d


















(2b + d)[2b − (n − 1)d](t + u + rj)
∀ i 6= j . (12)
Inserting these expressions into the solution equations (6), we obtain the optimal
pricing strategy
pi (zi) =
[2b − (n − 2)d](ai + bci) + d
P
j6=i (aj + bcj)







2(2b + d)[2b − (n − 1)d]
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In order to calculate the ex ante expected equilibrium proﬁts, we substitute the
optimal pricing strategy (13) into (4). Making use of the distributional properties
of the deviation parameters τi and taking the expected value over all possible in-
formation sets zi yields the ex ante expected equilibrium proﬁts (see the Appendix
A.1):
Ezi [πi (p)] =
 











(n − 1)d2 [3(n − 1)d2 + 4(n − 2)bd − 8b2]
4(2b + d)
2 [2b − (n − 1)d]
2
1









t + u + rj
)
(14)





(n − 1)bd2 [3(n − 1)d2 + 4(n − 2)bd − 8b2]
4(2b + d)
2 [2b − (n − 1)d]
2
t2
(t + u + ri)
2 . (15)6
As is shown in Appendix A.2, this derivative equals zero for d = 0, but has a positive
sign for all d 6= 0. Figure 1 illustrates this result for the case of substitutive goods
(0 < (n − 1)d < b), i.e. for a ﬁxed parameter d which implies that the Figure 1





Figure 1: Derivative (15) in the case of substitutive goods.
result derived by Raith (1996), ﬁrms producing substitutive goods will generally
choose an inﬁnite variance (ri → ∞) in information transmission which is equivalent
to concealing their private cost information. Using this conceiling strategy, ﬁrms
weaken the price competition and, hence, increase their expected proﬁts. Thus,
Gal-Or’s (1986) result for a duopolistic market indeed generalizes to oligopolistic
market structures. Even for a large number of ﬁrms, unilateral revelation of private
cost information never constitutes a Bayesian equilibrium strategy.
As is shown in Figure 2, with complementary goods (i.e. d assumed to be within the
range −b < d < 0), ﬁrms also gain by choosing inﬁnitely high variances ri because
there is again a positive eﬀect on the expected proﬁt level. Thus, independent of
the level of the demand parameter b and independent of the number of ﬁrms in the
market, also in the case of complementary goods ﬁrms always conceal their private
cost information.
In the special case of independent goods (d = 0) the derivative simpliﬁes to
∂Ezi[πi(p)]
∂ri = 0. As in such an industry ﬁrms behave as monopolists in their res-
pective markets, there will be no eﬀect of better or worse information about the





Figure 2: Derivative (15) in the case of complementary goods.
Therefore, our generalized model setup shows that Bertrand oligopolists always
conceal their private cost information. Silence is the golden strategy in all the cases
covered by our general model. This information policy does not depend on the num-
ber of ﬁrms in the market and holds for substitutive as well as for complementary
goods. Cost information exchange never constitutes a Bayesian equilibrium strategy.
Consequently, using the solution equations (6) with the coeﬃcients deﬁned in equa-
















and from (14) the expected equilibrium proﬁts
Ezi [πi (p)] =
 









Obviously, cost uncertainty softens competition and rises expected proﬁts, i.e. ﬁrms
gain from a higher cost uncertainty.8
3 Conclusion
By resolving and further generalizing an inﬂuential model of Raith (1996) we sho-
wed by theoretical analysis that, independent of the number of ﬁrms, concealing
cost information is a dominant strategy in heterogeneous Bertrand oligopolies with
substitutive as well as with complementary goods.
Furthermore, the presented model explains and supports the empirical observation
that ﬁrms generally refuse to reveal private cost information. As our analysis has
shown, concealing successful eﬀorts in obtaining process innovations should be an
important ﬁrm strategy, especially if patent protection is not perfect.9
Appendix
A.1 Ex Ante Expected Equilibrium Proﬁts
Substituting the optimal price strategies (13) into (4) and taking the expected value
over all possible information sets zi, in a ﬁrst step leads to the following expression
of the ex ante expected equilibrium proﬁts:
Ezi [πi (p)] =
 














































Making use of the distributional properties of the deviation parameters τi, the pri-







= t + u (19)
E(τiϕi) = t (20)
E(τiϕj) = 0 (21)
E(ϕiϕj) = 0 (22)
E(τiη2i
0 ˆ ϕ) = tη2ii (23)
E(τiη2j
0 ˆ ϕ) = tη2ji (24)
E(ϕiη2i
0 ˆ ϕ) = (t + u)η2ii (25)
E(ϕiη2j
0 ˆ ϕ) = (t + u)η2ji (26)
E(ϕjη2i
0 ˆ ϕ) = (t + u)η2ij (27)
E(η2i
0 ˆ ϕη2i















(t + u + rk)η2ikη2jk (29)10
Inserting these expressions (19) - (29) into (18) and rearranging yields the ex ante
expected equilibrium proﬁts (14).
A.2 Impact of Revelation Variances on Ex Ante Equilibrium
Proﬁts
For d 6= 0, −
(n−1)bd2t2
4(2b+d)2[2b−(n−1)d]2(t+u+ri)2 < 0, so that the sign of (15) only depends on
the sign of:
3(n − 1)d
2 + 4(n − 2)bd − 8b
2 (30)
As this is a convex quadratic function of the demand parameter d there exist up to
two values of d (furtheron deﬁned as d1 and d2) which imply (30) to be zero. In the
case of independent goods (i.e. d = 0) we obtain:
3(n − 1)d
2 + 4(n − 2)bd − 8b
2 = −8b
2 < 0 (31)






can be proofed by an analysis of d1 and d2: If neither d1 nor d2 is
located inside the range of d there is no change of the sign, wehereas if d1 and/or
d2 are located inside there will happen a change of the sign of (15). The values of
d1 and d2 can be derived as:
d1,2 =
−4(n − 2)b ±
q
16(n − 2)
2 b2 + 96(n − 1)b2
6(n − 1)
=
−2(n − 2)b ± 2b
√





−2(n − 2)b + 2b
√
n2 + 2n − 2
3(n − 1)
(33)





, the condition −b < d1 < 1
n−1b must
hold. This implies on the one hand d1 > −b, i.e.:11
−2(n − 2)b + 2b
√
n2 + 2n − 2
3(n − 1)
> −b
⇔ n + 1 + 2
√
n2 + 2n − 2 > 0 (34)
This condition holds for any number of ﬁrms n ≥ 2. The condition −b < d1 < 1
n−1b
on the other hand implies that d1 < 1
n−1b, i.e.:
−2(n − 2)b + 2b
√






⇔ −2n + 1 + 2
√
n2 + 2n − 2 < 0 (35)
This condition holds for no number of ﬁrms n ≥ 2. From (34) and (35) we therefore
conclude that d1 ≥
1






In the following, an analogous analysis is presented for d2. If
d2 =
−2(n − 2)b − 2b
√
n2 + 2n − 2
3(n − 1)
(36)





, the condition −b < d2 < 1
n−1b must
hold. This implies on the one hand d2 > −b, i.e.:
−2(n − 2)b − 2b
√
n2 + 2n − 2
3(n − 1)
> −b
⇔ n + 1 − 2
√
n2 + 2n − 2 > 0 (37)
This condition holds for no number of ﬁrms n ≥ 2. The condition −b < d2 <
1
n−1b
on the other hand implies that d2 < 1
n−1b, i.e.:
−2(n − 2)b − 2b
√






⇔ −2n + 1 − 2
√
n2 + 2n − 2 < 0 (38)
This condition holds for any number of ﬁrms n ≥ 2. From (37) and (38) we therefore












. Combining this knowledge with the result (31) for inde-
pendent goods we can conclude that the expression (30) is always negative. Consi-
dering this in the analysis of (15) we can proof that
∂Ezi[πi(p)]
∂ri > 0 for substitutes




Gal-Or, E. (1986): Information Transmission - Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria.
Review of Economic Studies 53, 85–92.
Jin, J. Y. (2000): A Comment on “A General Model of Information Sharing in Oli-
gopoly”, Vol. 71 (1996), 260-288, by Michael Raith. Journal of Economic Theory
93, 144–145.
Raith, M. (1996): A General Model of Information Sharing in Oligopoly. Journal of
Economic Theory 71, 260–288.
Sakai, Y. (1986): Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria under Imperfect Information.
Journal of Economics 46, 213–232.
Sakai, Y. (1991): Information Sharing in Oligopoly: Overview and Evaluation. Part
II. Private Risks and Oligopoly Models. Keio Economic Studies 28, 51–71.
Vives, X. (1984): Duopoly Information Equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand. Journal
of Economic Theory 34, 71–94.
Vives, X. (1999): Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools. Cambridge, Mass.
Ziv, A. (1993): Information Sharing in Oligopoly: The Truth-telling Problem. Rand
Journal of Economics 24, 455–465.